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HAND DELIVERED
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County v. Utah
State Tax Commission, ex rel Judd, Case No.
91-0256

Dear Mr. Butler:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Respondents Judd submit the case of Salt Lake County
v. State Tax Commission, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Sept. 30, 1991)
as supplemental authority for the argument set forth at pages
14-17 of the Brief of Respondents Judd. Respondents believe that
this case, a copy of which is attached hereto, is relevant to
their argument that their property was properly found to be
subject to assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act.
Sincerely,
&

ik C. Attwood
JCA:jdg
Enclosure
cc: Bill Thomas Peters, Esq.
Lee A. Dever, Esq.
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Original Proceeding in This Court
ATTORNEYS:
David £. Yocum, Karl L Hendnckson, Bill
Thomas Peters, Salt Lake Citv, for Salt
Lake Count)
R. Paul Van Dam, Bryce H Pettev, Salt Lake
City, for State Tax Commission
Clark Waddoups, Roger D Hennksen, for
Bell Mountain Corporation
This opinion is subject to roision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
This case is before us on a writ of review to
the Utah State Tax Commission. §alt Lake
County seeks review of a decision of the
Commission that seven contiguous parcels ef
vacant land totalling approximately 431.41
acres in Salt Lake County qualified for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act of
1969 (F A.A.), Utah Code Ann. §§59-586 to-105 (1986).1 Bell Mountain Corporation is the owner of the parcels of land, which
he on the foothills of the NKa^atch Mountains
adjacent to an exclusive residential area which
Beil Mountain has developed and continues to*
develop gradually on its terfd. For the years
1983, 1984, and 1985, Salt Lake County assessed the parcels as farmland. In 1986, the
County denied F.A.A. status for the property;
assessed it at market value, and applied the
rollback tax. Bell Mountain appealed to the
Commission. The Commission, in an informal
hearing, decided that the Count) 's assessment
was proper Pursuant to Bell Mountain's
request for a rehearing, the Commission rendered a formal decision reinstating the seven
parcels to F A . \ status The Commission
lound that, for the 1986 tax vear, the cattle
that pastured on the propertv were sold for
$2,413 99 Although one dissenting commissioner felt that the statutorv requirement
'activeh devoted to aencultural use" was not
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met by Bell Mountain, the Commission coneluded that Bell Mountain met the preference
criteria of section 59-5-8"" in that the propertv exceeded five acre^. produced an annual
gross .Rcome n exce^ of $1.0(0 per vear from
agricultural jse. and had *etn in agricultural
use for :he :-AO ;mmed'jt,!v preceding vears.
Our Ntandard of rev.ew :S governed !^v the
Liah \c1mmistranve Procedures Act. Lrah
Code Ann
§6? 4 6 b : 2 i.l9$9),
nasmuch
as all agencv adjudicative proceedings here
under review were commenced after January
1. 1988. Under that standard, we grant relief
in this case only if the Commission's facts are
not supported bv substantial evidence when
viewed in the light of the whole record, §6346b-!o(4)(g), or that the Commission erroneously interpreted or applied the law, §6346b-16(4)(d). See, generally Monon Int'J v.
Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 163 Utah Adv. Rep.
34 (1991 j (discussing standard of review under
APA).

j disqualify H trom farmiano assessment j .
j
One of the commissioners, in his dissent,
' pointed out the high cost to the taxpavers of
affording F A.A status to large acreages of
land ripe for re^der.tial development ^lmpiv
bcau^e the acreage temporarily sUNtjins a few
head o\ cattle. An> evil m thi^ regard cannot
be corrected m this 'orum. Only the legislature,
has the power to curb excesses which ma> be
permuted bv the present statutory minimum
qualifying requirements.
The Countv next contends that the Comm: ission erred bv granting F.A.A. >t3tus to the
full 431.41 acres because Bell Mountain
' admitted that us cattle grazed on onl> about
100 acres. The remainder of the acreage was
j not grazed because of its steepness and inacj cessibility due to gullies and ravines. We noie
1 at the outset that only land which is "used for
, agricultural purposes" is permitted by the
; Utah Constitution to be assessed at less than
its fair market value. Article 13, section 3(2)
provides:
The County first contends that the propejly
is not "land which is actively devoted to agri- ,
Land used for agricultural purposes
cultural use" as required by >ection 59-5-8? |
may, as the Legislature prescribes,
because Bell Mountain is a real estate develbe assessed according to its value
oper and its agricultural activity on this land is «
for agricultural use without regard
nominal at best. The County in essence asks '
to the value it may have for other
us 10 construe the term "actively devoted to j
purposes.
agricultural use" as requiring that land be I
In implementation of that constitutional
either farmed for profit or "primarily |
provision, the legislature has defined "land in
devoted* to agricultural use. See Annotation, j
agricultural use" in Utah Code Ann. §59-5Taxes- Treatment of Agricultural
Land, 98 j
88 (now §59-2-502) as follows:
A.L.R.3d 916 (1980), for cases supporting this I
Land shall be deemed to be in
construction. We disposed of this issue in Salt
agricultural use when devoted to the
Lake County" v. State Tax Commission, 779 j
raising of plants and animals useful
P.2d 1131 (Utah 19S9), where this court reje- 1 !
to man including but not limited to:
cted the limited interpretation the County j
forages and sod crops; grains and
attempts to place on the words "actively |
feed crops; dairy animals, poultry,
devoted/ as the statute itself does not
livestock, including beef cattle,
mandate, exclusive j or primary devotion te
agricuTtVfra! use. Id. at 1132-33.
sheep, swine, horses, ponies, mules
or goats, including the breeding or
In that case, the land in question was a
grazing of any or all of such
buffer zone around a plant in which explosives :
animals ....
were manufactured. On the land, wheat was j
raised and livestock grazed. We affirmed the j In Township of Ando\er v. Kymer. 140 N.J.
State Ta.x Commission's decision that the land j Super. 399, 356 A.2d 418 (1976), the court
was actively devoted to agricultural use even ; was confronted with whether to grant farmthough it also served an industrial use. Id. j land assessment status to a 210-acre farm of
which only between 41 and 100 acres were
Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that the
land is held primarily for residential develop- | actually under cultivation. It did not appear
that any part of the land was used for the
ment and that the grazing of cattle thereon is
an incidental and secondary use does not dis- ' grazing of animals. The township tax assessor
qualify the land from assessment under the ! refused to assess as farmland the acreage that
F.A.A. so long as the acreage, income, and \ was wooded or swampy or consisted of rocky
other requirements of section 59-5-89 are j terrain with no evidence of cultivation. The
met. The very purpose of the F.A.A. is to ; court held that the woody, swamps, rocky
acreage with a marginal value for agricultural
allow- land which has become valuable for a
or horticultural jse may be given the special
nonagricjltural u<e to be assessed as agricultfarmland ta_x treatment as long as those areas
ural land as long as agricultural activity is
actually carried on and the minimum qualify an a "part of. appurtenant to. or reasonably
ying requirements of ;he act are satisfied. See
required for the purpose of maintaining :he
To*n>hip of Ando\er
v. Kymer. 140 N.J.
land actually devoted to farming use. particSuper. 399. 356 A 2d -M8 (19"6) (the fact that
ularly where it has been part of the farm for a
an owner holds his '.and for resale does not
I TAH ADVANCE REPORTS

number ot vears " 140 N J Super at 4(H 3<6
A 2d at 420 In holdine thai ihe assessor
should have given the special farmland tax
treatment to he enure tract the court while
acknowledging that the primary goal ot he
legislation was to save 'he familv farm and to
provide farmers Aith some economic rehet bv
permittinc their lands to be taxed ai a lower
assessment also stated hat another objec ive
was to encourage the maintenance and pre^e
rvation of open space and beautv of the cou
ntrvside 140 N J Super at 404 ^ 6 A 2d at
420
In contrast in blah farmland assessment
can be extended to property onlv if it is in
agricultural use Our constitution and statutes
do not permit it for open spaces which may
have aesthetic value Land to be given F A A
status therefore must complv *uh the legisla
tive definition of agricultural use in section <9
5 88 set out above In so holding we reco
gnize as did the New Jersey court that it
would be a staggering undertaking" for the
assessor to have to extract nonfertile areas
from everv tract of farmland 140 N J Super
at 404 05 3^6 A 2d at 420-21 The statute
need not be applied as the law of the Viedes
and the Persians We are aware that even on
the best of farms there may be relatively small
areas which are not strictly "devoted to the
raising of plants and animals useful to man "
\Ke aKo acknowledge that nonproductive areas
sometimes mav be reasonably required for the
purpose of maintaining the land actually
devoted to production A certain amount of
liberality must be indulged in if the legislative
purpose and common sense are to prevail
However, in the instant case, it appears that
as much as "5 percent of the acreage sought to
be given preferential assessment is not grazed
by the cattle or accessed by them for watering
shelter or anv other purposes This acreage is
not reasonablv required for the purpose of
maintaining the land auuallv grazed nor does
\i in anv wax support activity on that land
Under these circumstances, it cannot be succ
essfullv maintained that such acreage is in
agricultural use* Furthermore* the seven separateh described tracts were not ever part of I
unit farm as was the case in Township of
Ando\er v k\mer
For all that appears in the
record the seven parcels mav have been acq
uired bv the taxpa>er at different times and
the onlv relationship between them is simplv
that thev meet each other at one or more ot
their corners We do not believe that it was
the in em ot the constitutional authorization
in art vie H sec ion 1(2) and of the implem
ent n2 statutes that tracts not in actual agnc
ultural use could be bootstrapped onto a core
of aencultural property and therebv spread the
preferent al tax assessment to a Aide area
Finauv the Countv challenges the Commi
ssion s findings that Bell Mountain obtained
its income through an arm s length transa

etion Property n \ regulation no 9 located in
M 2 14 I
\ d m nistration
Regulations
Farmland VscsMnem Act ot 1%^ provides

I
I
|
i
I
'

|
,
1

I
j
I

|
.
j

j Cross
n^omc
Section
9*
0 1 ) and r )ss ales Section *9 N
*90
hill *oth De intcrpK cd o
mean cms alts
r> Ml sjk must be made at arms
[sk] length in order to quality
v. Income as required tor F A A
qualitication under section ^9 ^
8"* shall be determined as being tax
reportable and will be substantiated
bv appropriate income tax sched
ules
Bell Mountain pays taxes on an accrual
basis It recorded the income here at issue as
earned in September 1985, though payment
was not received until January of the folio
wing vear The income from the cut and
wrapped meat sold to two shareholders ol
Bel' Mountain, was shown as Si 000 Another
$1 4 H 99 was received in 1986 There was
substantial evidence in the record that the
prices paid bv the two shareholders were at or
near live market prices published bv the Dep
artment of Agriculture for the same period tor
slaughter steers in the same weight range The
evidence was also uncontroverted that receipts
and checks produced reflected the sales that
the shareholders and Bell Mountain were
separate entities at all times and that the
income had been reported on Bell Mountain s
tax returns Therefore there is no error in the
Commission's finding that the sales were
arm s length transactions
The decision of the Commission is reversed
and the case is remanded to the Commission
for the purpose of granting F A A status to
only that part of the acreage which is in agn
cultural use as explained in this opinion
WE CONCLR
Gordon R Hall Chief Justice
1 Daniel Stewart Justice
1 In 98" ihe ecislature ecoditicd the Act jnder
Ltah Code Ann §<9 2 >0l <198") and renamed
a (he Farmland A >o mem Aet None of ihe ^ubs
(anme provisions here at issue ha\e been v.han*ed
bui we e er to the 1969 Ad lor ^hronoloe»«.al a*.*.
urawV
ZIWMERWAS,
Dissenting)

Justice

(Concurring and

I join Justice Howe s opinion except 'hat
port on apparent!) holding that the State TaA
Commission did not properly determine That
all ot the land in question was devoted iO
dgriculiu al purpose^ F rsi the Commission
eon>idered rhe facts and determined that the
land was eligible for the exemption including
the par< of the parcels that were too steep
and sullied for the cattle to graze upon
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justice Howe's opinion reverses this essentially factual determination without explaining,
other than in the most general way, how the
record evidence fails to supper the Commis«o*'< conclusion
Second e\en il the legal standard applied
bv the Commission to determine whe'her land
ib "devoted 'o" agricultural purpose- *as
incorrect, as Justice Howe s opinion >uggests,
the court toduv has not explained to the
Commission or r o the bar A hat the proper
standard is Some language in the opinion can
be read to suggest that the exemption is. to be
denied onlv with respev to those tracts of
which no part is phvsicallv used for agricultural purposes However, other language suggests that the exemption is not available tor
an\ portion of a parcel "not in actual agricultural use
11 the former standard is the appropriate
test, then 1 assume the Commission can
administer the law without much difficultv
(assuming that we explain to them in some
greater detail how to determine, as the majority has apparentlv done in this case, when
land is "devoted t o ' raising livestock and how
to determine whether "nonproductive areas
[are] reasonablv required for the purpose of
maintaining the land actually devoted to production") But if the Commission must deduct
from every parcel of land otherwise eligible
for the exemption the acreage that is not either
devoted to agriculture or a nonproductive area
reasonablv required for the maintaining of
land so devoted, then we have created precisely the "staggering undertaking" for the assessor warned against by the New Jersey court
in Township of Ando^cr v Kymer, 140 N J.
Super
399, 404-05, 356 A 2d 418, 420
(1976) It is no answer to say blithely that the
statute "need not be applied as the law of the
Medes and the Persians." That will hardly be
helpful guidance to the Commission
The
Commission must apply, the law as we construe it By our construction, we act as the
Medes and the Persians, and we have created
an absurdly unadministerable law

Cie as

170 Ltah Kdy. Rep. 16
IN T H E S I P R E M E C O l RT
OF T H E S T A T E OF I T A H
STXTP of Ltah,
Plaintiff and Appellee.
Steven Trov SPAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890152
FILFD: September 30, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake Countv
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
ATTORNEYS
R Paul Van Dam, David B Thompson, Salt
Lake Citv for appellee
Brooke C Wells. Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt
Lake Citv tor appellant
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

STEWART. Justice:
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Steven Troy Span appeals his conviction ot
one count of aggravated arson, a first degree
felony Span claims the evidence was tnsufficient to support the conviction, the prosecutor
deliberately introduced evidence which had
been excluded by the trial court, and the
prosecutor improperly used a peremptory
challenge to remove a potential juror from the
venire because of the juror's race

J

I. FACTS

I

Sometime between 3 15 and 3 20 a m on
November 16, 1988, Brent Van Os and Curt
Taylor drove past an apartment complex
loca'ed at 2800 South Adams Street m Salt
Lake and noticed a fire in a second story
apartment of the complex After Van Os and
Taylor checked the affected apartment to
determine if it was unoccupied 3nd knocked
on doors to warn other residents. Van Os
called the Tire department at 3 32 a m The
South Salt Lake Fire Department arrived
within five minutes and quickly extinguished
the blaze David Meldrum, who investigated
the fire with a team of arson experts, estimated that the fire had burned in a single apartment for approximately fifteen or twentv
minutes before the fire department arrived
Meldrum concluded that the fire had been
intentionallv set He based his conclusion on
the mtensitv of the fire, the burn pattern of
the fire, the presence in the apartment of a
puneent odor hours after the fire, which indicated the use of an accelerant, and other
peculiar factors Meldrum excluded the possibihtv that the fire was accidental

'

i

Durham, Justice, concurs with the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Zimmerman.
'
j
!

,
j

1
1

i
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